Archive for September, 2010

Stuxnet Update (taken with a grain of salt)

Hot off the presses:  Nothing.

Per Fox news – Pentagon Spokesman Col. David Lapan said Monday the Department of Defense can “neither confirm nor deny” reports that it launched this attack.

A standard reply on subjects of national security, I suppose.  But you may note that there’s not a whole lot of hoopla going on or statements from the Pentagon that we’re scrambling to make sure it’s not going to happen here.  While it’s true there are serious things going on led by serious people in serious organizations to reduce the possibility that it will happen here (mad props to my homies at NERC / FERC / even DOE), but no official statement from the Pentagon encouraging the private sector to batten down the hatches. 

On the other hand, the only place I could find this wishy-washy, standard-practice Pentagon statement was via Fox News, so take that for what it’s worth.

All in all, I still stand my previous implications of the Chapman / Jackson spy team.


Stuxnet: we have met the enemy…

The Stuxnet virus / trojan / attack has been receiving a lot of press and there’s lots of speculation as to who’s behind it.  This, of course has greased the gears in my tiny little scheming paranoid mind and I’ve assembled a timeline of world events and some factoids about Stuxnet for your reading pleasure.  Use at your own risk.

Backstory:

In the event you’ve been living under a rock (or aren’t in IT), Stuxnet is a computer virus / worm that is very sophisticated and attacks specific software controlling specific control systems that are used in all kinds of industrial plants.  It has huge potential to do large scale horrible things.  Many security professionals / industry experts say this was the work of a nation-state, attacking another.  Up to speed?  Super.

Theory:

So if you happen to be a nation-state, how do you launch a cyber attack without giving up your own arsenal?  Consider traditional warfare (handgun version):  Good guy shoots bad guy.  Bad guy has possession of the bullet, good guy keeps the gun.  Without the gun, the bullet is useless.  Compare this to cyber war:  Good guy exploits a zero-day vulnerability on bad guy’s system.  Bad guy collects evidence and analyzes/evaluates the attack and now has the capability to exploit the same system.  The equivalent of reverse engineering a gun out of a bullet – now bad guy has the capability to attack similar systems.  See a problem there?  It’s quite likely that good guy is also running the same systems, running the same software, supporting similar infrastructure within his own country.  Seems to me that before this is actually done in the real world, somebody would launch a test shot; somewhat harmful, but not intended to absolutely destroy the adversary.  Just to see how the vendors, community, and world at large would react.

And as my friend and real, actual rocket scientist, Doctor Bob has pointed out, war college teaches that successful strategies involve multiple attack vectors.

Is stuxnet a sophisticated, multi-facted proof of concept?  And who dunnit?  Judge for yourself.  I’ve highlighted what I think are key concepts.

Timeline:

February 25, 2009 this photo shows an error indicating unlicensed software running at Iran’s newest power plant.  Yes, it’s the software that was attacked, and happens to have emerged four days after one of the time stamps on the signed files.  The plant is being built by Atomstroyexport, a Russian firm.
June 25, 2009 Michael Jackson is (errantly) reported dead
July 23, 2009 US Cyber Command created by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates under the command of General Keith Alexander
July 31, 2009 Three American anti-war, social justice and Palestinian solidarity activist hikers arrested in Iran by border guards and held on espionage charges
November 8, 2009 Fearmongering media outlet 60 minutes airs “Cyberwar: Sabotaging the System” chock full of half-truths and crap, but airs it nonetheless.
January 28, 2010 Marines announce their Cyberspace Command at the National Cryptologic Museum.
February 21, 2010 CNN airs “We Were Warned – Cyber Shockwave”.
March 17, 2010 Jesse James totally blows it by cheating on that goddess Sandra Bullock.  Totally, totally blows it.  Moron!
April 2010 US (and Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany) puts pressure on the UN to impose sanctions on Iran due to their nuclear program
April 26, 2010 Lindsay Lohan fired from “The Other Side” because she’s not “bankable”.
May 21, 2010 Intial Operations Capability acheived at CYBERCOM.
June 16, 2010 Florida declares war on the Medfly which is infesting local guava crops.
June 17, 2010 Mark Weatherford (former Naval Officer) replaces Michael Assante as Chief Information Secuirty Officer at the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
June 27, 2010 Uber-hottie Russian spy Anna Chapman arrested.
July 8, 2010 US announces “Perfect Citizen” program to help defend industrial networks. Anna Chapman deported to Russia for a spy-swap, from which we got a bunch of ugly fat guys back (you’ve won this round, commrade!).
July 10, 2010 First of five Lunatic rants released, starring Mel Gibson. That’s “Lunatic” with a capital L.
July 13, 2010 Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri, missing since May 2009, surfaces – he had taken refuge in the Iranian interests section of Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C.   Conflicting claims made (supported by video) that he was kidnapped by the CIA from Saudi Arabia, versus in Arizona going to college.
July 16, 2010 first Stuxnet infections discovered in Iran announced
July 21, 2010 Clue found in code disclosed:  “b:\myrtus\src\objfre_w2k_x86\i386\guava.pdb” is found in one of the drivers.
July 22, 2010 China announces its Information Security Base, a defensive cyber security team for the People’s Liberation Army.
August 31, 2010 Officials state Iran’s newest nuke plant will be delayed.  They say extereme temperatures.  But isn’t it always extremely hot there?

Supporting Factoids:

From what I can find by examining everything online, is that the “words” used in the file naming and dll routines are in english.

The USB malware stops infecting after three systems.  It’s like they didn’t want this to get out of control – just attack the single target.  Three times.

Guava was frequently used in military rations in WWII.  There are groves of guava trees on Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Station.

Conclusion:

US Cyber Command launched an attack targetting Iran’s newest power plant in order to hamper the nuclear program.  They did it by having Anna Chapman coerce one (or more) Atomstroyexport contractors to swap infected USB drives (likely ones that look and maybe are labelled just like the other presumed “safe” drives) with existing ones.  Michael Jackson in his new role as special operative was the chief architect behind the software, his gloved hand tipped by his love of Guavas.  Currently, US Cyber Command is monitoring this situation carefully, to determine how quickly the community reacts so it can time future attacks.  Mel Gibson and Lindsay Lohan are not suspects in this case.

There may be some inaccuracies in the conclusion.  For example, I’m not sure Michael Jackson still wears the glove.  And Weatherford at NERC – …coincidence?

To quote Pogo: “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”


Terry Jones, A**hole du jour

Dear Pastor Terry Jones -Terry Jones

Hey, buddy, how’s it going?  I just wanted to send a quick note to let you know that you’re an asshole of amazing proportions, if that isn’t incredibly clear at this point.  Here’s why:

  1. You’re supposed to be a Christian – forgive me if I’m wrong, but isn’t one of the core teachings of Jesus “turn the other cheek”?  Oh, right – clearly you can’t forgive me or anyone else, and feel the need to publicly display your incapability of doing so (and anti-Christian behavior) by disrespecting millions of people.  If you’re really a Christian, clearly you’re a Christian Asshole.
  2. How many people are you intending to hurt?  And which people would they be?  If you haven’t heard, your Koran burning will likely incite violence against Christian Americans.  Unfortunately you’re American – but at least we can see you’re an American Asshole.
  3. You are going to offend ALL Muslims on 9/11.  Aren’t you really just pissed off at just a couple of ‘em?  Sure, the Muslim community has some assholes, most notably (and significant by the date you’ve chosen) Bin Laden.  Well, I suppose we’ve got assholes here as well – you being the American Christian Asshole Club’s (ACAC) reigning Asshole-In-Chief.  Congratulations on your promotion, and your new memberhsip in it’s sister organization, the Worldwide Asshole Club. 

 

And one last thing – I’m travelling this weekend.  If I get stuck not being able to get back due to grounded flights or something like that, I’m going to come to Florida and kick your friggin’ ass!

Seriously, dude, knock it off.   Asshole.

Jim
Recovering Asshole, and member of Assholes Anonymous

P.S.:  Hey, Britain – how about doing us a solid here and finding a use for this guy?  We took Piers Morgan!


Compliance vs. Security

Need some sleep?  Try reading compliance manuals.My alter ego was invited to host a round table at a conference recently, on the topic of “Security and Compliance in IT Networks”.  The conference was hosted by a network provider / integrator in town, and focused on topics such as migrating to high performance wide-area networks and the like – “carrier-class” topics.  The biggest security concern, for most attendees, is the prevention of denial of service.   And “compliance” doesn’t have a whole lot of applicability to carrier networks.   So I had a nice blank slate, and a “roundtable” that would likely be a bunch of 10 year old questions (questions on topics that are 10 years old; not implying that they’re coming from 10 year olds).

So in typical Jovian fashion, I decided I’d take the most controversial stance I could (while remaining on topic) that Compliance had nothing to do with security – in fact, they’re almost mutually exclusive.  I quoted the statistics from the latest Verizon Data Breach Investigations report, interpreting the statistics to match my agenda appropriately and prepared to engage in a pointed discussion.  Here’s a quick summary of how the statistics could be viewed (or “skewed”):

  1. 21% of organizations subject to PCI were fully PCI compliant. 
  2. Out of the remaining 79%, on the average, 39.75% of those were compliant with the majority of PCI requirements. 
  3. In other words, 31.4% of the organizations subject to PCI were mostly or entirely non-compliant.

 

It then it goes on to say:

The [PCI] standard is authored to provide an approach towards security, built to make unauthorized access to systems and data iteratively harder through a series of control gates.

The idea here was that I would infer from this that organizations in compliance more (“comlplianter”?) would be less subject to breach – as one becomes compliant by implementing more “control gates”, you would be more secure as a result.  However, the data presented in the Verizon study simply don’t uphold that premise, since from above, rougly equal numbers of compliant, semi-compliant, and non-compliant organizations were represented in the study, with only a slight lead taken by those that are completely compliant.

At least that was the premise for the conversation, coupled with a liberal sprinkling of McAfee and Symantec threat report goodness for added flavor.  So how’d it go, you ask? 

Crickets.  Nobody wanted to talk about any of that hoo-ha, they just wanted to know how to keep their damn networks up.  So the round table became a dissertation on the techniques behind DDOS with a then-and-now perspective, talking about how easy it was to how complex it’s become, citing cases from February of 2000 through the most recent Yahoo and DNSmadeeasy.com’s attack.  Same conclusion as always:  fix it with more bandwidth and processing power.  Ho-hum.

But the real value was in preparing the presentation, because it tore me away from catching up on Snooki’s adventures in North Jersey and got me … well, thinking.  Compliance and Security are in fact closely related, and each entirely benefit from the other.  Now before you go thinking I’ve flipped my lid, let me explain:

To start with, the Random House Unabridged dictionary defines compliance as:

  1. the act of conforming, acquiescing, or yielding.
  2. a tendency to yield readily to others, esp. in a weak and subservient way.
  3. conformity; accordance: “in compliance with orders”.
  4. cooperation or obedience: “Compliance with the law is expected of all.”

 

Ok, so you can see this goes totally against every fiber of my being.  Sort of like Joe Walsh’s “Ordinary Average Guy”, you know – where he sings about the guy who takes out the garbage, cleans out the garage, goes bowling, average kids and wife – all the things I rebelled against as a starry(bloodshot?)-eyed young man aspiring to be a rock star.  And here I am, damnit, with a day job and a mortgage.  I blame my ex-wife for all of it.  But I’m digressing.

Regulatory Compliance is something that is enforced by some kind of regulatory body.  The enforcement is usually in the form of civil or criminal penalties.  Take PCI or HIPAA.  Both have fairly significant sanctions for non-compliance.  (yes, I know that enacting sanctions based on noncompliance for these involves zillions of dollars in court costs on behalf of the regulatory entity and the non-compliant entity, and that it’s challenging at best to even get a slap on the wrist administered, but just ride this out with me here). 

Sanctions are applied and delivered to the highest level of governance at the organization.  This tends to make the top of the organization angry, and that anger is typically directed through executive management as vague and poorly thought out, yet forecefully delivered, edicts.  That cascades through the organization and gathers size and steam – the proverbial poop-rolls-downhill metaphor in action.  By the time it ends up as a splattered steamy stain on your new Manolo-Blahniks, it’s death by stoning  for anyone who doesn’t prostrate themselves before their immediate supervisor to honor this new proclamation and do whatever it takes (lying, falsifying records, etc) to be compliant.

Are we secure yet?  Nope.  We’ve just witnessed a cultural ripple – a wave that made it to shore.  It’s what “actual security” can piggyback on and make it all the way through the organization.  Compliance (or rather, the impact of non-compliance) can bring with it serious cultural change in an organization – it can be the catalyst for implementing the security program you’ve been pitching to the board and seeing ignored due to lack of funding for years (although the new Aeron Chairs in all the conference rooms were clearly more important).  It’s something that you can totally leverage.  

The moral / conclusion to this long winded story?

  1. Make sure you’re not responsible for compliance.
  2. Scrap your security pitch, and rewrite it as if you’re implementing it in response to a gigantic non-compliance fine.
  3. Get fined for non-compliance.  I don’t know, maybe hire a hacker, sell pictures to TMZ, whatever it takes.
  4. Let chaos ensue.
  5. Save the day with your new security compliance plan, get a raise and a promotion.  And one of those cool new aeron chairs.

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